The Most Overlooked Spot on the Patriots
In the wake of Kevin Faulk's retirement from football, there were many articles about how Faulk's accomplishments went beyond the stats (and rightfully so). Stats are terrific at giving you an outside glimpse of what went on during the game, but they almost never tell the whole story.
Stats never telling the whole story is, in essence, the story of Kevin Faulk's career. Everyone from Bill Belichick and Tom Brady to Vince Wilfork and Troy Brown lauded Faulk's ability to, somehow, almost miraculously according to his teammates, gain the first down, whether it be on the ground of through the air.
This ability is something that is lost, not just on the majority of third-down backs, but on NFL players in general.
How many times during an NFL game do you see a receiver run a route that is a yard or two short and then the defensive back or linebacker comes and makes the tackle in front of the first down marker? It happens in every game, usually multiple times and it drives fans (and nothing to say of the coaches) absolutely bonkers.
Now sometimes the route is supposed to be run short of the line and it is up to the receiver to make the first down because he is supposed to have open field in front of him; other times it is just awful situational awareness by the route runner (and it happens to veterans as well as rookies). Kevin Faulk, with ONE lone exception, made a career out of ALWAYS getting the first down (and the one first down he failed to make, the infamous "4th & 2," he did make. To this day, I see it as one of the worst spots in the history of the NFL).
"Getting the first down," is the top priority of the third down back, but he does not always have to be the man with the ball in order to ensure his team gets that first down.
Your prototypical third down back is three things: a solid receiver, a decisive runner/route runner, and excellent at blitz pickups/blocking. If you have a third down back that cannot do one of those three things, you do not have a good third down back.
Notice, good, not great. The great third down backs separate themselves from the good by doing what Kevin Faulk made a career out of doing; picking up the first down when the Patriots needed it the most.
If you had asked me two years ago if the Patriots were going to be lucky enough to draft another Kevin Faulk-type third down back, I would have told you the chances were about as good as finding another Tom Brady in the sixth round. And guess what? The Patriots have been unable to draft anybody remotely close to Kevin Faulk, but they did not need to because the Jets gave them their next Kevin Faulk: Danny Woodhead.
If there is a better third down back in the NFL, in terms of what he can do for his team, I have not seen them (oh, and you are wrong). Woodhead might not be the best third down back, but he is the best third down back possible for the Patriots.
I am sure by now you all know the story of Danny Woodhead: small (and then some) running back out of Chadron State, makes his way onto the New York Jets, Rex Ryan has an orgasm watching him during the preseason and NFL Hard Knocks catches it for some glorious NFL Films footage, he gets relegated to the practice squad after the 2009 season where Bill Belichick says "thank you very much," scoops up the wee lad and brings him onto the Patriots where he has become an absolute revelation as their third down back of the future.
The game against the Broncos was a microcosm of how Woodhead has evolved into the new Kevin Faulk for the Patriots. If you did not see the game and just looked at the stats, you would completely miss Woodhead's contributions.
Woohead's stat line from Sunday:
7 rushing attempts, 47 yards, 6.7 yards per rush, Long of 19, 0 TDs, 1 reception for 25 yards, 0 TDs.
At first the rushing numbers jump out because of the 6.7 average yards per rush. Then you delve in a little more deeply and you recognize the long of 19 yards. The long of 19 was even more impressive in real life than it was on paper.
The 19 yard gain came on a 3rd & 17 on a zone rush to the left side of the line. The Broncos were in a light personnel and the Patriots line opened up a great rushing lane and it seemed like everyone from the receivers to the popcorn vendor had a hat on a Bronco and Woodhead scooted up the field for 19 yards and a first down. The Patriots would go on to score a touchdown on the drive.
As impressive as the 19 yard run was, the 25 yard reception was even better.
The rush was a run many backs could make (Woodhead saw the hole and made a quick cut up-field and fell forward for the first down), but the 25 yard reception was something only a small handful of backs could accomplish.
On a 3rd and 14 in the second quarter the Patriots called a passing play and like many third downs, Woodhead was in on the play and his assignment was to block. Brady had to scramble as all of the receivers were covered on the play (three on the left and Deion Branch on the right and running a crossing pattern). Brady did what many do not give him much credit for, which is he scrambled and extended the play, in this particular case he scrambled to his right and while doing so Woodhead leaked out of the backfield after reading no blitzing linebackers. However, as he exited the backfield he was covered by Broncos' Joe Mays.
Not many cornerbacks can cover Danny Woodhead one-on-on... Joe Mays is not a cornerback. Joe Mays is a linebacker, a very good linebacker, but Woodhead turned him inside out on the play; Woodhead feigned to the inside and literally ran around Mays while breaking to the outside, Brady hit him in stride and 25 yards later the Patriots had a first down. The Patriots would eat up the clock for the rest of the first half and end up with a field goal.
For those of you keeping track at home, Woodhead was directly responsible for keeping together two drives that resulted in ten points for the Patriots. Usually stats do not end up this perfectly, but the Patriots coincidentally ended up winning the game 31-21.
Woodhead's predecessor, Kevin Faulk, was the master at picking up the first down when it mattered and coming up with the clutch plays. Even though it is only a couple of seasons since the Patriots acquired Woodhead, he appears to be the Patriots third down back of the future and, hopefully, people will be singing his praises a decade from now.
Friday, October 12, 2012
Wednesday, October 10, 2012
4th & Game
The Easiest and Most Misunderstood Call in Football
Charles P. Pierce, a fantastic writer for Esquire and a Staff Writer for Grantland, called it "inexplicable." I've read other columns where writers, who apparently have no time to come up with original titles, called it "Fourth and Five-Gate." What was it? A call by Patriots Coach Bill Belichick on a 4th & 5 in the fourth quarter of the Patriots' game this Sunday.
I'm sure you know what happened next; Tom Brady dropped back and was sacked/fumbled and the Broncos took over in good field position with Peyton Manning looking like the Manning of old and ready to ram the ball down the Patriots throat. I'm sure you also know the Patriots' defense, and in particular Rob Ninkovich, stepped up and forced a Willis McGahee fumble and ran out the clock, thus ensuring the Patriots victory.
Why are the uproar about the fourth down call?
"Because the Patriots gave the Broncos the ball in good field position."
"Because you don't go for it on fourth and medium."
"Because the Patriots could have pinned the Broncos down near their own game line."
These are all valid points... these are all stupid points.
Anybody watching that game could tell you the Patriots were running (literally and figuratively) roughshod over the Broncos: they amassed the most first downs in Patriots history, Wes Welker looked like Wes Welker and was practically impossible to cover on Sunday, and the running backs were just as unstoppable including a conversion on 3rd & 17... on a RUN... by DANNY WOODHEAD.
What about that previous paragraph made you feel uneasy about the Patriots' chances of converting that fourth down?
If you were having flashbacks of the infamous 4th & 2 against the Colts and Peyton Manning I can empathize with you a little bit, but the call was right that day (and I still believe Kevin Faulk was given a crappy spot) and the call to go for it on Sunday was the right one as well.
Just two weeks ago Ron Rivera of the Panthers elected to not go for it on 4th & 1 in a game against the still undefeated Falcons. This, despite Cam Netwon gaining the yardage for the first on 3rd & 2 (he fumbled, hence the 4th & 1) on the previous play. And even though he got the best result possible out of the punt (the ball being downed at the Falcons' one yard line) they still went on to lose the game.
When you have an offensive juggernaut like the Patriots, or a running juggernaut like the Panthers (21 of 24 in 3rd and 4th & shorts) and you have a chance to ice the game with your offense, you go ahead and you do it. Why leave it up to risk ("Risk" being any NFL Defense in the offensive haven that is now the NFL) when you can end the game with one play, with one yard (or in the Patriots offense's case, five yards, which might as well have been one with the way they were moving it Sunday)?
The media loves to grill coaches who do not do the "safe thing" and instead go for it on fourth and short. They will point to those very same Falcons and their proclivity for going for it on fourth down and how it may have cost them a postseason game against the Giants. Or New England media might point to the 4th & 2 against the Colts and say they lost the game on that play (coincidentally forgetting that Manning was sawing his way through the Patriots defense in the second half like a Civil Way surgeon; bloody and relentless).
The only thing playing it safe does is give the coach an excuse for why he did not go for it. Go into any locker room and ask, "I'll give you one chance this game where all you have to do is gain one yard and I will guarantee a win, would you take it?" Guess what percentage of players will nod their heads and say, "hell yeah, let's go..." Thought it over? Good, if you guessed 100% you get a gold star.
Look at any win probability metric and they will tell you the reward outweighed the risks when it came to going for it on all of those fourth down decisions ("You mean reward equal win and risk equal only slightly less chance of win, Mongo go for it.") However, even if you are not one to look up win metrics and "win probability" is something you scoff at, think of this, "if you had a chance to keep the ball out of Peyton Manning's hands and win the game, would you do it?"
Now let's see if you get another gold star...
Charles P. Pierce, a fantastic writer for Esquire and a Staff Writer for Grantland, called it "inexplicable." I've read other columns where writers, who apparently have no time to come up with original titles, called it "Fourth and Five-Gate." What was it? A call by Patriots Coach Bill Belichick on a 4th & 5 in the fourth quarter of the Patriots' game this Sunday.
I'm sure you know what happened next; Tom Brady dropped back and was sacked/fumbled and the Broncos took over in good field position with Peyton Manning looking like the Manning of old and ready to ram the ball down the Patriots throat. I'm sure you also know the Patriots' defense, and in particular Rob Ninkovich, stepped up and forced a Willis McGahee fumble and ran out the clock, thus ensuring the Patriots victory.
Why are the uproar about the fourth down call?
"Because the Patriots gave the Broncos the ball in good field position."
"Because you don't go for it on fourth and medium."
"Because the Patriots could have pinned the Broncos down near their own game line."
These are all valid points... these are all stupid points.
Anybody watching that game could tell you the Patriots were running (literally and figuratively) roughshod over the Broncos: they amassed the most first downs in Patriots history, Wes Welker looked like Wes Welker and was practically impossible to cover on Sunday, and the running backs were just as unstoppable including a conversion on 3rd & 17... on a RUN... by DANNY WOODHEAD.
What about that previous paragraph made you feel uneasy about the Patriots' chances of converting that fourth down?
If you were having flashbacks of the infamous 4th & 2 against the Colts and Peyton Manning I can empathize with you a little bit, but the call was right that day (and I still believe Kevin Faulk was given a crappy spot) and the call to go for it on Sunday was the right one as well.
Just two weeks ago Ron Rivera of the Panthers elected to not go for it on 4th & 1 in a game against the still undefeated Falcons. This, despite Cam Netwon gaining the yardage for the first on 3rd & 2 (he fumbled, hence the 4th & 1) on the previous play. And even though he got the best result possible out of the punt (the ball being downed at the Falcons' one yard line) they still went on to lose the game.
When you have an offensive juggernaut like the Patriots, or a running juggernaut like the Panthers (21 of 24 in 3rd and 4th & shorts) and you have a chance to ice the game with your offense, you go ahead and you do it. Why leave it up to risk ("Risk" being any NFL Defense in the offensive haven that is now the NFL) when you can end the game with one play, with one yard (or in the Patriots offense's case, five yards, which might as well have been one with the way they were moving it Sunday)?
The media loves to grill coaches who do not do the "safe thing" and instead go for it on fourth and short. They will point to those very same Falcons and their proclivity for going for it on fourth down and how it may have cost them a postseason game against the Giants. Or New England media might point to the 4th & 2 against the Colts and say they lost the game on that play (coincidentally forgetting that Manning was sawing his way through the Patriots defense in the second half like a Civil Way surgeon; bloody and relentless).
The only thing playing it safe does is give the coach an excuse for why he did not go for it. Go into any locker room and ask, "I'll give you one chance this game where all you have to do is gain one yard and I will guarantee a win, would you take it?" Guess what percentage of players will nod their heads and say, "hell yeah, let's go..." Thought it over? Good, if you guessed 100% you get a gold star.
Look at any win probability metric and they will tell you the reward outweighed the risks when it came to going for it on all of those fourth down decisions ("You mean reward equal win and risk equal only slightly less chance of win, Mongo go for it.") However, even if you are not one to look up win metrics and "win probability" is something you scoff at, think of this, "if you had a chance to keep the ball out of Peyton Manning's hands and win the game, would you do it?"
Now let's see if you get another gold star...
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